Time to Rethink
Immigration?
by Peter Brimelow
from National Review, June 22, 1992
Mr. Brimelow is Editor at
VDARE.com.

DANTE
would have been
delighted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
waiting rooms. They would have provided him with a tenth
Circle of Hell. There is something distinctly infernal
about the spectacle of so many lost souls waiting around
so hopelessly, mutually incomprehensible in virtually
every language under the sun, each clutching a number
from one of those ticket-issuing machines which may or
may not be honored by
the INS clerks before the end of the Civil Service
working day.
The danger of damnation is
perhaps low—although a Scottish friend of mine once found
himself flung into the deportation holding tank because the INS
misunderstood its own rules. And toward the end of my own
ten-year trek through the system, I whiled away a lot of time
watching confrontations between suspicious INSers and agitated
Iranians, apparently hauled in because the Iran hostage crisis
had inspired the
Carter Administration to ask how many of them were enrolled
in U.S. universities. (The INS was unable to provide an answer
during the 444 days of the hostage crisis-or, as it turned out,
at all.)
Nevertheless, you can still
get a pretty good blast of brimstone if you dare suggest that it
might be another of those misunderstandings when, having finally
reached the head of the line, you are ordered by the clerk to go
away and come back another day with a previously unmentioned
Form XYZ.
Your fellow huddled masses
accept this treatment with a horrible passivity. Perhaps it is
imbued in them by eons of arbitrary government in their native
lands. Only rarely is there a flurry of protest. At its center,
almost invariably, is an indignant American spouse.
Just as New York City's
government can't stop
muggers but does a great job ticketing young women on Park
Avenue for failing to scoop up after their lapdogs, current U.S.
immigration policy in effect enforces the law only against those
who obey it. Annual legal immigration of some 950,000-counting
the 140,000 refugees and the 100,000 granted political asylum-is
overwhelmed by the 2 to 3 million illegal entries into the
country every year, which result in a net annual increase of
perhaps 250,000 illegal aliens. (A cautious estimate-again, no
one really knows.)
The INS bureaucracy still
grinds through its rituals. But meanwhile the U.S. has lost
control of its borders. As it turned out, I could have avoided
my INS decade by the simple expedient of staying here after I
graduated from Stanford in 1972 and waiting to be amnestied,
along with some 3.2 million other illegal immigrants, by the
1986 Immigration Act.
There is another parallel
with New York: Just as when you leave Park Avenue and descend
into the subway, on entering the INS waiting rooms you find
yourself in an underworld that is almost entirely colored. In
1990, for example, only 8 per cent of 1.5 million legal
immigrants, including amnestied illegals, came from Europe. (And
a good few of those were on-migrants from Asia or the
Caribbean.)
Only the incurious could
fail to wonder: Where do all these people get off and come to
the surface? That is: What impact will they have on America?
Where Will
They Surface?
AMERICAN LIBERALS, of
course, are determinedly, even devoutly, incurious about this
subject. You quickly learn not to raise such matters with them
at all.
The silence of American
conservatives has a more complex cause. To a significant degree,
it's due to sheer ignorance. In the early 1970s, a
battle-scarred Goldwater veteran brushed aside my news from the
INS waiting rooms. The U.S., he said, was far too big for
immigration to have any but the most marginal effect. When later
I showed him a news report that the inflow from the former
British West Indies had quintupled during the previous decade,
he was astonished. (These numbers add up. By 1973, over 220,000
West Indians lived in the New York area alone. And it was just
the beginning. The number of Jamaicans immigrating to the U.S.
between 1951 and 1980 amounted to more than a tenth of the
island's population. By 1990, almost another tenth of Jamaica
had arrived in the U.S., the highest proportion from any country
in the world.)
Very few people can absorb
new realities after the age of 21. And conservative leaders now
in their fifties spent their formative years in one of the
greatest lulls in the history of American immigration—the result
of restrictive quota legislation designed to favor Northern
Europeans in the 1920s, followed by the Depression and World War
II. Amazingly, only about 500,000 legal immigrants entered the
U.S. in the whole of the 1930s. (In those days, there was
virtually no illegal immigration.) And only about a million
entered in the 1940s, including World War II refugees. By
contrast, of course, the U.S. accepted over 1.5 million
immigrants, counting only legals, in the single year of 1990
alone.
The Great Immigration Lull
was ended dramatically by the 1965 Immigration Act. Typical of
so many Great Society reforms, it was passed amid much
moralizing rhetoric and promptly had exactly the opposite of its
advertised effect.
U.S. immigration policy was not transformed without debate. There was a
debate. It just bore no relationship to what subsequently
happened. In particular, staunch defenders of the
national-origins quota system, like the
American Legion, allowed themselves to be persuaded that the
new legislation really enacted a sort of worldwide quota, no
longer skewed toward Northern Europe—a policy easily caricatured
as "racist" in the era of the civil-rights movement—but
still restricting overall immigration to the then-current level
of around 300,000. (A detailed account of Congress's deluded
intent and the dramatic consequences appears in Lawrence
Auster's devastating The Path to National Suicide: An Essay
on Immigration and Multiculturalism, published by AICF.)
Today, it is astonishing to
read the categorical assurances given by supporters of the 1965
Immigration Act. "What the bill will not do," summarized
Immigration Subcommittee chairman Senator Edward Kennedy:
"First, our cities will not be flooded with a million immigrants
annually. Under the proposed bill, the present level of
immigration remains substantially the same ... Secondly, the
ethnic mix will not be upset . . . Contrary to the charges in
some quarters, [the bill] will not inundate America with
immigrants from any one country or area, or the most populated
and deprived nations of Africa and Asia . . ."
Every one of these
assurances has proved false. Immigration levels did surge
upward—they are now running at a million a year. Immigrants do
come predominantly from one sort of area—85 per cent of the 11.8
million legal immigrants arriving in the U.S. between 1971 and
1990 were from the Third World, 44 per cent from Latin America
and the Caribbean, 36 per cent from Asia—and from one country:
20 per cent from Mexico. And about 33,000 Africans arrived in
1990, which looks small only by comparison.
Above all, the American
ethnic mix has been upset. In 1960, the U.S. population was 88.6
per cent white; in 1990, it was only 75.6 per cent white—a drop
of 13 percentage points in thirty years. (Indeed, the proportion
of "European-Americans" is probably a couple of
percentage points lower than that, because the Census Bureau
counts all Middle Easterners as "white.") The demographer
Leon Bouvier has projected that by 2020—that is, easily within
the lifetimes of many NATIONAL REVIEW readers—the proportion of
whites could fall as low as 61 per cent. Among children under
15, minorities could be approaching the point of becoming the
majority.
These projections put into
context the common claim that—as Professor Julian Simon put it
in The Economic Consequences of Immigration (1990), a
book that has been widely accepted by conservatives as their
bible on the subject—"contemporary immigration is not high by
U.S. historical standards." In fact, immigration is high, in
terms of absolute numbers, by comparison with all but the peak
decade of 1901-10, when about 8.7 million immigrants arrived,
part of the great wave from Southern Europe. And counting
illegals, the 1981-90 decade probably matched and may have
exceeded that total. Furthermore, this latest wave shows no sign
of receding. Nor, given the Third World's demographic structure,
is there any particular reason to suppose it will.
Of course, immigration is
lower in relative terms than in the first decade of the
twentieth century—the total U.S. population at that time was
less than a third of today's. However, this was not a proportion
that could extend indefinitely. Immigration has never been
relatively higher than when the second Pilgrim Father came down
the gangplank, increasing the
Plymouth Colony's population by 100 per cent. As it is, the
U.S. takes half of all the emigrants in the world.
But it also is crucial to
note a point always omitted in pro-immigration polemics: in
1900, the U.S. birthrate was much higher than today. American
Anglos' birthrates, for example, are now below replacement
levels. So immigrants have proportionately more demographic
impact. By the early 1980s, immigration was running at the
equivalent of about 16 per cent of native births-including
births to immigrants—and rising. This is eminently comparable to
the 19.9 per cent of 1901-10. Hence the steadily shifting ethnic
balance.
"The government should dissolve the people and elect another
one," quipped
the Communist playwright Bertolt Brecht after the East German
riots of
1953. For good or ill, the U.S. political elite seems to be
acting on his advice.
Immigration
Sleight of Hand
PERHAPS BECAUSE the 1965
Immigration Act was slipped through in such a deceptive way,
many Americans, and many conservatives, just do not realize that
it is directly responsible for this transformation of their
country. They tend to assume that a kind of natural phenomenon
is at work—that Hispanics, for example, increased from 4.5 per
cent of the U.S. population in 1970 to 9 per cent in 1990
because they somehow started sprouting out of the earth like
spring corn.
But no natural process is
at work. The current wave of immigration, and America's shifting
ethnic balance, is simply the result of public policy. A change
in public policy opened the Third World floodgates after 1965. A
further change in public policy could shut them. Public policy
could even restore the status quo ante 1965, which would slowly
shift the ethnic balance back.
It's often said that
Europeans no longer want to emigrate. But in fact the 1965 Act
cut back a continuing flow: the number of British immigrants,
for example, had been running at around 28,000 a year and was
immediately reduced by about half. Along with other Europeans,
the British seem simply to have been diverted to the countries
that compete with the U.S. for skilled immigrants: above all
Australia and Canada.
And all such dogmatic
assertions about immigration are dangerous. Witness the sudden
influx of more than 100,000 illegal Irish immigrants in the late
1980s—and the wholly unexpected unfreezing of a sea of potential
immigrants from Eastern Europe in the early 1990s.
Since 1965, moreover, U.S.
public policy has in effect actively discriminated against
Europeans. This is because, in another reversal, the 1965 Act
placed a higher priority on "family reunification" than
on admitting immigrants with skills. And "reunification"
meant relatives no matter how remote. So the new immigrants
arriving from countries that had not been traditional sources
were able to sponsor so many additional immigrants that they
crowded out European applicants with skills but no family
connections from the "overall quota"—-before spilling
over into the special category of admissions outside the
"overall quota," which turned out to be vastly larger than
predicted.
As a result, the post-1965
immigration is not only much bigger than expected: it is also
less skilled. And it is becoming even less so—one economist,
Professor
George J. Borjas, himself a Cuban immigrant, has gone so far
as to say, in his 1990
Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S.
Economy, that "the skill level of successive
immigrant waves admitted to the U.S. has declined precipitously
in the past two or three decades." For example, in 1986 less
than 4 per cent of the over 600,000 legal immigrants were
admitted on the basis of skills.
Paradoxically, Borjas says,
the U.S. attracts disproportionate numbers of unskilled people
from Third World countries because the income distribution there
is so unequal. The poor have the most to gain. Conversely, it is
skilled workers who have the most to gain by leaving egalitarian
Western Europe—if they could get in here.
Some more skilled
immigrants will be coming to America as a result of legislation
in 1990, which—initially as a result of pressure from Irish
groups—increased the skill quota by rather less than 100,000.
But the price of this, extracted by other, post-1965 ethnic
lobbies, was a substantial overall increase in
family reunification immigration.
Come, All Ye
Huddled Masses
JUST AS conservatives tend
to think immigration is a natural phenomenon, they also assume
vaguely that it must have been ratified by some free-market
process. But immigration to the U.S. is not determined by
economics: it is determined—or at least profoundly distorted—by
public policy. Inevitably, there are mismatches between skills
supplied and skills demanded. Which helps explain why—as Borjas
demonstrated in Friends or Strangers—welfare
participation and poverty rates are sharply higher among the
post1965 immigrants, with some groups, such as Dominicans and
other Hispanics, approaching the levels of American-born blacks.
Borjas's findings, although
well understood among specialists, will be surprising to many
conservatives. They contrast sharply with some of Julian Simon's
more familiar conclusions. The basic reason: Simon's data were
old, reflecting earlier, more traditional immigrant
groups—another danger in this rapidly changing area.
Such is the grip of the
American elite's pro-immigration consensus, however, that book
reviewers simply assumed Borjas must be pro-immigration too.
They failed to pick up what he described as his "worrisome"
evidence that problems were developing with the post1965
immigrant flow. Thus Business Week's Michael J. Mandel
reviewed both Borjas's and Simon's books under the
drum-beating heading "DOES AMERICA NEED MORE 'HUDDLED
MASSES'? YES." Possibly provoked by such total misreadings,
Borjas the following year spelled out his position in the
preface to his paperback edition:
it is almost certain that
during the 1990s new immigrants will make up at least a third
of all new labor market entrants. In view of the available
empirical evidence, there is no economic rationale to
justify this huge increase in the size of the foreign-born
population. (Italics added!)
On close examination, at
least some pro-immigration enthusiasts turn out to be perfectly
well aware that current policy is deeply flawed. Ben J.
Wattenberg has popularized the idea that the U.S. can become
"The First Universal Nation," as his 1991 book is
titled, drawing its population from every corner of the globe.
This romantic vision has entranced quite a few conservatives.
But they don't seem to have noticed that in that book,
Wattenberg actually calls for "designer immigration"—radically
reoriented toward skills rather than family reunification,
keeping out illegals and ending what he describes as the "odd
situation" whereby Europeans are effectively discriminated
against. Of course, he hastens to add, this will not cut back on
Third World immigrants as such. (Wattenberg tells me that the
1990 Act was merely "a good solid half-step forward" and
that he "still advocates designer immigration.")
'A Nation of
Immigrants'
EVERYONE HAS seen a
speeded-up film of the cloudscape. What appears to the naked eye
to be a panorama of almost immobile grandeur writhes into wild
life. Vast patterns of soaring, swooping movement are suddenly
discernible. Great towering cumulo-nimbus formations boil up out
of nowhere, dominating the sky in a way that would be terrifying
if it were not, in real life, so gradual that we are barely
aware that anything is going on. This is a perfect metaphor for
the development of the American nation. America, of course, is
exceptional. What is exceptional about it, however, is not the
way in which it was created, but the speed.
'"We are a nation of
immigrants." No discussion of U.S. immigration policy gets
far without someone making this helpful remark. As an immigrant
myself, I always pause respectfully. You never know. Maybe this
is what they're taught to chant in schools nowadays, a sort of
multicultural Pledge of Allegiance.
But it secretly amuses me.
Do they really think other nations sprouted up out of the
ground? ("Autochthonous" is the classical Greek word.)
The truth is that all nations are nations of immigrants. But the
process is usually so slow and historic that people overlook it.
They mistake for mountains what are merely clouds.
This is
obvious in the case of the British Isles, from which the largest
single proportion of Americans are still derived. You can see it
in the place-names. Within a few miles of my
parents' home in the north of England, the names are Roman
(Chester, derived from the Latin for camp), Saxon (anything
ending in -ton, town, like Oxton), Viking (-by, farm, like
Irby), and Norman French (Delamere). At times, these successive
waves of peoples were clearly living cheek by jowl. Thus among
these place-names is Wallesey, Anglo-Saxon for "Island of the
Welsh"—Welsh being derived from the word used by low-German
speakers for foreigners wherever they met them, from Wallonia to
Wallachia. This corner of the English coast continued as home to
some of the pre-Roman Celtic stock, not all of whom were driven
west into Wales proper as was once supposed.
The English language that
America speaks today (or at least spoke until the post-1965
fashion for
bilingual education) reflects the fact that the peoples of
Britain merged, eventually; their separate contributions can
still be traced in it. Every nation in Europe went through the
same process. Even the
famously homogeneous Japanese show the signs of ethnically
distinct waves of prehistoric immigration.
But merging takes time.
After the Norman Conquest in 1066, it was nearly three hundred
years before the invaders were assimilated to the point where
court proceedings in London were again heard in English. And it
was nearly nine centuries before there was any further
large-scale immigration into the British Isles—the
Caribbean and Asian influx after World War II.
Except in America. Here the
process of merging has been uniquely rapid. Thus about 7 million
Germans have immigrated to the U.S. since the beginning of the
nineteenth century. Their influence has been profound—to my
British eye it accounts for the odd American habit of getting up
in the morning and starting work. About 50 million Americans
told the 1980 Census that they were wholly or partly of German
descent. But only 1.6 million spoke German in their homes.
What Is a
Nation?
SO ALL NATIONS are made up
of immigrants. But what is a nation—the end-product of all this
merging? This brings us into a territory where words are
weapons, exactly as George Orwell pointed out years ago.
"Nation"—as suggested by its Latin root nascere, to
be born intrinsically implies a link by blood. A nation is an
extended family. The merging process through which all nations
pass is not merely cultural, but to a considerable extent
biological, through intermarriage.
Liberal commentators, for
various reasons, find this deeply distressing. They regularly
denounce appeals to common ethnicity as "nativism"
or "tribalism."
Ironically, when I studied African history in college, my
politically correct tutor deprecated any reference to
"tribes." These small, primitive, and incoherent groupings
should, he said, be dignified as "nations." Which
suggests a useful definition: tribalism/nativism is nationalism
of which liberals disapprove.
American political debate
on this point is hampered by a peculiar difficulty. American
editors are convinced that the term "state" will confuse
readers unless reserved exclusively for the component parts of
the United States—New York, California, etc. So when talking
about sovereign political structures, where the British would
use "state," the Germans "Staat," and the
French "l'etat," journalists here are compelled to
use the word "nation." Thus in the late 1980s it was
common to see references to "the nation of Yugoslavia,"
when Yugoslavia's problem was precisely that it was not a nation
at all, but a state that contained several different small but
fierce nations—Croats, Serbs etc. (In my constructive way, I've
been trying to introduce, as an alternative to "state,"
the word "polity"—defined by Webster as "a politically
organized unit." But it's quite hopeless. Editors always
confuse it with "policy.")
This definitional
difficulty explains one of the regular entertainments of U.S.
politics:
uproar because someone has unguardedly described America as
a
"Christian nation." Of course, in the sense that the
vast majority of Americans are Christians, this is nothing less
than the plain truth. It is not in the least incompatible with a
secular state (polity).
But the difficulty over the
N-word has a more serious consequence: it means that American
commentators are losing sight of the concept of the
"nation-state"—a sovereign structure that is the political
expression of a specific ethno-cultural group. Yet the
nation-state was one of the crucial inventions of the modern
age. Mass literacy, education, and mobility put a premium on the
unifying effect of cultural and ethnic homogeneity. None of the
great pre-modern multinational empires have survived. (The
Brussels bureaucracy may be
trying to create another, but it has a long way to go.)
This is why Ben Wattenberg
is able to get away with talking about a "Universal Nation."
On its face, this is a contradiction in terms. It's possible, as
Wattenberg variously implies, that he means the diverse
immigrant groups will eventually intermarry, producing what he
calls, quoting the English poet John Masefield, a "wondrous
race." Or that they will at least be assimilated by American
culture, which, while globally dominant, is hardly
"universal." But meanwhile there are hard questions. What
language is this "universal nation" going to speak? How
is it going to avoid
ethnic strife? dual loyalties? collapsing like the
Tower of Babel? Wattenberg is not asked to reconcile these
questions, although he is not unaware of them, because in
American political discourse the ideal of an American
nation-state is in eclipse.
Ironically, the same
weaknesses were apparent in the rather similar concept of
"cultural pluralism" invented by Horace M. Kallen at the
height of the last great immigration debate, before the Quota
Acts of the 1920s. Kallen, like many of today's pro-immigration
enthusiasts,
reacted emotionally against the calls for "Americanization"
that the 1880-to-1920 immigrant wave provoked. He argued that
any unitary American nationality had already been dissipated by
immigration (sound familiar?). Instead, he said, the U.S. had
become merely a political state (polity) containing a number of
different nationalities.
Kallen left the practical
implications of this vision "woefully undeveloped" (in
the words of the
Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups). It
eventually evolved into a vague approval of tolerance, which was
basically how Americans had always treated immigrant groups
anyway—an extension, not coincidentally, of how the English
built the British nation.
But in one respect,
Kallenism is very much alive: he argued that authentic
Americanism was what he called "the American Idea." This
amounted to an almost religious idealization of "democracy,"
which again was left undeveloped but which appeared to have as
much to do with non-discrimination and equal protection under
the law as with elections. Today, a messianic concern for global
"democracy" is being suggested to conservatives as an
appropriate objective for U.S. foreign policy.
And Kallenism underlies the
second helpful remark that someone always makes in any
discussion of U.S. immigration policy: "America isn't a
nation like the other nations—it's an idea."
Once more, this American
exceptionalism is really more a matter of degree than of kind.
Many other nations have some sort of ideational reinforcement.
Quite often it is religious, such as Poland's Roman Catholicism;
sometimes cultural, such as France's ineffable Frenchness. And
occasionally it is political. Thus—again not coincidentally—the
English used to talk about what might be described as the
"English Idea": English liberties, their rights as
Englishmen, and so on. Americans used to know immediately what
this meant. As
Jesse Chickering wrote in 1848 of his diverse fellow
Americans: "English laws and institutions, adapted to the
circumstances of the country, have been adopted here . . . The
tendency of things is to mold the whole into one people, whose
leading characteristics are English, formed on American soil."
What is unusual in the
present debate, however, is that Americans are now being urged
to abandon the bonds of a common ethnicity and instead to trust
entirely to ideology to hold together their state (polity). This
is an extraordinary experiment, like suddenly replacing all the
blood in a patient's body. History suggests little reason to
suppose it will succeed. Christendom and Islam have long ago
been sundered by national quarrels. More recently, the
much-touted
"Soviet Man," the creation of much tougher ideologists
using much rougher methods than anything yet seen in the U.S.,
has turned out to be a Russian, Ukrainian, or Kazakh after all.
Which is why Shakespeare
has King Henry V say, before the battle of Agincourt, not "we
defenders of international law and the dynastic principle as it
applies to my right to inherit the throne of France," but
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.
However, although
intellectuals may have decided that America is not a nation but
an idea, the news has not reached the American people-especially
that significant minority who sternly tell the Census Bureau
their ethnicity is "American." (They seem mostly to be of
British origin, many generations back.) And it would have been
considered absurd throughout most of American history.
John Jay in The Federalist
Papers wrote that Americans were "one united people, a people
descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of
government, very similar in their manners and customs." Some
hundred years later, Theodore Roosevelt in his Winning of the
West traced the
"perfectly continuous history" of the Anglo-Saxons from
King Alfred to George Washington. He presented the settling of
the lands beyond the Alleghenies as "the crowning and
greatest achievement" of "the spread of the
English-speaking peoples," which—though personally a liberal
on racial matters—he saw in
explicit terms: "it is of incalculable importance that
America, Australia, and Siberia should pass out of the hands of
their red, black, and yellow aboriginal owners, and become the
heritage of the dominant world races."
Roosevelt himself was an
example of ethnicities merging to produce this new nation. He
thanked God—he teased his friend Rudyard Kipling—that there was
"not a drop of British blood" in him. But that did not
stop him from identifying with Anglo-Saxons or from becoming a
passionate advocate of an assimilationist Americanism, which
crossed ethnic lines and was ultimately to cross racial lines.
And it is important to note
that, at the height of the last great immigration wave, Kallen
and his allies totally failed to persuade Americans that they
were no longer a nation. Quite the contrary: once convinced that
their nationhood was threatened by continued massive
immigration, Americans changed the public policies that made it
possible. While the national-origins quotas were being
legislated, President Calvin Coolidge put it unflinchingly:
"America must be kept American."
Everyone knew what he
meant.
'Pulling Up
the Ladder'
ANOTHER of those helpful
lines exactly describes what Americans did in the 1920s:
"Pulling up the ladder." But pulling up the ladder may be
necessary—if the lifeboat is about to capsize.
And the American lifeboat
undeniably did stabilize after the 1920s. It took time. As late
as 1963, when
Nathan Glazer and
Daniel Patrick Moynihan published
Beyond the Melting Pot, the ethnic groups that had
arrived in the 1880-to-1920 wave appeared not to be assimilating
into the American mainstream. At best, as Will Herberg argued in
Protestant, Catholic, Jew, there was a
"triple melting pot"
working within the major religious communities—for
example, Irish Catholics marrying Italian Catholics; German Jews
marrying Russian Jews.
But then, just when the
media-academic complex had tooled up an entire industry based on
the
"unmeltable ethnics," they started to melt. The figures
are dramatic. According to Robert C. Christopher in his 1989
Crashing the Gates: The De-Wasping of America's Power Elite,
half of all Italian-Americans born since World War II married
non-Catholics, mainly Protestants; some 40 per cent of Jews
marrying in the 1980s chose Gentile spouses, a phenomenon rare
if not unknown only twenty years earlier.
Christopher, a former
Newsweek writer and political liberal, naturally saw this
development as an emerging cultural synthesis free (at last!) of
any nasty ethnic connotations at all. But there is a simpler
interpretation: the American nation was just swallowing, and
then digesting—Wasping, to adapt Christopher's terminology—an
unusually large and spicy immigrant meal.
This pattern of swallowing
and digesting has recurred throughout American history. Waves of
immigration have been followed by lulls right back into colonial
times. After the turmoil of the Revolutionary War, there was a
Great Lull remarkably similar to the one earlier this century.
For nearly fifty years, there was practically no immigration at
all. The U.S. grew rapidly through natural increase. But the
make-up of the white population remained about what it had been
in the 1790 Census: largely (60 per cent) English, heavily (80
per cent) British, and overwhelmingly (98 per cent) Protestant.
This was the nation
Alexis de Tocqueville described in
Democracy in America (1835)—an irony, since his name has
now been
adopted by Gregory Fossedal's pro-immigration lobby. That
Tocqueville's analysis still has relevance is a tribute to that
nation's powers of assimilation and cultural transmission.
Thereafter, immigration
relative to U.S. population peaked about every fifteen or twenty
years: in 1851-54, 1866-73, 1881-83, 1905-07, and 1921-24. In
between it plunged, by as much as three-quarters or more. And
the ethnic composition continuously changed. Earlier in the
century, the largest element was Irish; in the middle, German;
by the end, from Southern and Eastern Europe. After 1924,
immigration was reduced to a trickle but that trickle was from
Northern and Western Europe. These variations in the magnitude
and make-up of immigration were vital to the process of
digestion.
And this pattern of
variation puts a different perspective on the immigration
debate. For example, it is conventional to dismiss all concerns
about immigration with the argument that such fears have proved
groundless in the past. Of course, this is illogical. Just
because a danger has been averted in the past does not mean it
cannot happen in the future. Many passengers might have climbed
aboard the lifeboat safely; one more may still capsize it.
But in fact these concerns,
which have been expressed by the most eminent Americans going
right back to colonial times, were perfectly reasonable. They
were rendered moot only by changing circumstances. Thus Benjamin
Franklin
worried about German immigration in 1751: "Why should
Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of Aliens,
who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of
our Anglifying them... ?" Franklin was not proved wrong:
instead, German immigration was halted—in the short run, by the
Seven Years' War (1756-63); in the longer run, by the
post-Revolution Great Lull.
Similarly, the nativist
anti-Catholic "Know-Nothing" insurrection, which had
seized six state governments and elected 75 congressmen by 1855,
was the
reaction, harsh but human, of a Protestant nation that had
forgotten immigration to its
apparently imminent inundation by Irish Catholics fleeing
the 1846 potato famine. Subsequently, Know-Nothingism receded,
partly because of the Civil War, but also because the supply of
Irish Catholics turned out to be finite after all. The Irish
made up nearly half of the 1851-54 wave. They were perhaps a
fifth or less of the subsequent trough.
The public policies that
excluded Asian immigration for nearly a hundred years also
appear rather different in this historical perspective. The
California Legislature's 1876 report on immigration
complained that the Chinese "have never adapted
themselves to our habits, mode of dress, or our educational
system... Impregnable to all the influences of our Anglo-Saxon
life, they remain the same stolid Asiatics that have floated on
the rivers and slaved in the fields of China for thirty
centuries of time." Whatever its dark motive, this is on its
face a very specific complaint about the difficulty of
assimilating immigrants from a pre-modern society. In the
interim, the
Orient has modernized. Today, immigrants from the area are
often viewed (perhaps
naively) as the most, well, "Anglo-Saxon," of the
current wave.
Ask a Stupid
Question...
HISTORICAL perspective also
discredits another conventional ploy in the immigration debate:
"How can X be against immigration when the nativists wanted
to keep his own great-grandfather out?" This, of course, is
like arguing that a passenger already on board the lifeboat
should refrain from pointing out that taking on more will cause
it to capsize.
But let's assume, for the
sake of argument, that X is Irish-American. Disqualifying him
from the debate overlooks the long and painful adjustment to
America that the Irish, like every immigrant group, had to make.
The Irish too came to the U.S. from what was still basically a
pre-modern agricultural society. Throughout the
nineteenth century, they displayed
social pathologies strikingly similar to those of the
current black ghetto: disease, violence, family breakdown, drug
addiction (alcohol in those days), and, perhaps not
surprisingly, virtually no intermarriage.
Slowly, over generations,
America changed the Irish—and they changed themselves. Today, in
terms of measures like income, education, and political
affiliation, Irish-Americans are more or less indistinguishable
from the mainstream, with which they have extensively
intermarried. (Well...
alcoholism is a little higher. But so are incomes.) In his
book
The Economics and Politics of Race: An International Perspective,
the Hoover Institution economist Thomas Sowell describes this as
"historically . . . one of the great social transformations
of a people." Irish-Americans have earned the hard way their
right to opinions about who and how many their country can
absorb.
The
Irish changed themselves with a great deal of encouragement from
a notably stern clergy. But the Roman Catholic Church itself
made an adjustment to America. Indeed, the word
"Americanization" was invented in the 1850s by a Vermont
Yankee convert to Catholicism,
Orestes A. Brownson, who argued in his
Brownson's Quarterly Review
that the nativists had a point: the Irish should
assimilate to the American nation that had already been formed;
the Church should not identify itself with Old World
autocracy—as
Pius IX, after the
1848 Revolutions in Europe, was inclined to do. Brownson
provoked a ferocious controversy. But, today, his view can be
seen to have prevailed.
In politics as elsewhere,
if you ask a stupid question, you get a stupid answer—at any
rate a terse answer. And asking people if they want their
communities to be overwhelmed by weird aliens with dubious
habits is a stupid question. The answer is inevitable. Until now
in America, chance circumstances and changes in public policy
have always combined to change this question before the
inevitable answer became too embarrassing. But the greater the
number of immigrants, and the greater their
difference from the American mainstream, the louder and
ruder the answer will be.
The political elite may
choose not to hear. Others, however, will.
Closing the
Floodgates
AT THE MOMENT, the
political elite shows every sign of choosing not to hear. The
immigration floodgates were opened by accident in 1965. Opinion
polls show most Americans want them shut—for example, in a
recent poll by FAIR, 84 per cent wanted Congress to take a more
active role in decreasing immigration and stopping the entry of
illegal aliens. But the elite's reaction is unexpectedly odd: it
stands around idly, alternately ignoring the situation,
denouncing anyone uncouth enough to mention it, and, most
frequently, indulging in romantic rationalizations ("The more
the merrier" "Diversity is strength")
This sort of after-the-fact
rationalization infests U.S. immigration history. Thus the
much-loved lines on the base of the Statue of Liberty
. . . Give me your tired, your
poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched
refuse of your teeming shore...
—are not part of the
Declaration of Independence or some other pronouncement of the
Founding Fathers. Instead, they are the reaction of a young
Zionist, Emma Lazarus, to the
Russian pogroms following the assassination of Czar
Alexander II in 1881. They were added years after the dedication
of the statue, which was a
gift from France to commemorate the U.S centennial and
originally supposed to symbolize, not "The Mother of
Immigrants" in Miss Lazarus's phrase, but "Liberty
Lighting the World"—"liberty under law," adds FAIR
Chairman Dan Stein, thinking grimly of recent amnesties for
illegals.
And they aren't even true.
American immigration has typically been quite selective, if only
because the cost of passage was (until recently) an effective
filter. "... even throughout the early history of the U.S.,"
admits Julian Simon, "immigrants did not arrive with less
education than natives had—contrary to popular belief and
contrary to the famous poem by Emma Lazarus ..." Early
English settlers included Royalist gentry who went to Virginia,
like George Washington's ancestors, and Puritan gentry who went
to New England, as Oliver Cromwell and his family once planned
to do. And, whatever Yankees may have thought, the Irish
immigrants of the 1850s were not the bottom of the barrel.
Three-quarters of them were literate; their fares were commonly
paid by established extended families.
It was
thirty years from the founding of the
Immigration Restriction League in 1894 to the passing of the
restrictions in the 1920s. FAIR was founded in 1979 and the AICF
in 1983. So there are some years to go.
Still, there can be little
doubt that, this time around, the political elite has been
notably more inhibited about responding to the issue. One
important reason has been pointed out by Katherine Betts in
Ideology and Immigration, her study of the
parallel Australian situation. Using polling data, Professor
Betts showed that while non-traditional immigration was viewed
with increasing
hostility among ordinary Australians, the
university-educated were inclined to favor it. Favoring
immigration, she concluded, was "part of a cluster of values
defining
social status for Australian intellectuals."
The "New Class," as
Irving Kristol has called the confluence of educators,
bureaucrats, and media professionals, has everywhere emerged as
the key sociological fact of late-twentieth-century political
economies. Dogmatic attitudes on immigration and race have
become a badge of New Class superiority to ordinary people—and a
route to power, since the social stresses resulting from
non-traditional immigration are a splendid excuse for further
government programs.
Deference to these elite
values explains to a significant degree the silence of American
conservatives about the current immigration wave-in such
striking contrast to the aggressive Americanism of Republicans
from Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt last time around.
In his first volume of his
autobiography,
Making It, Norman Podhoretz describes the
"brutal bargain" by which he says the children of
Eastern European Jews were accepted into WASP society at the
price of repressing their ethnic mores. Similarly, American
conservatives have reached what might be called a "bland
bargain" with their country's ruling establishment.
Conservatives are now
somewhat more likely to be allowed into public debate than in
the dark years of the 1950s. But they still must not say
anything that impinges upon the truly sacred liberal
taboos—above all anything that might be remotely connected with
ethnicity or race. And immigration, of course, is inextricably
so connected.
Slaves naturally try to
curry favor with their masters. Some conservatives, fixated on
the issue of economic growth, have apparently calculated that,
by emphasizing the (assumed) need for more immigration, they can
establish their non-racist credentials and even advance their
limited agenda with the liberal elite.
Slaves can even grow to
love their chains. Some conservatives have internalized the
prohibitions under which they must operate. An example, alas,
seems to be
Paul Gigot, the otherwise estimable Washington columnist of
the Wall Street Journal editorial page. Writing about the
question, which became an issue early in the 1992 presidential
election cycle, of whether a million Englishmen or a million
Zulus would assimilate more easily into Virginia, Gigot
expressed good inside-the Beltway distaste. Then he added an
economic-growth twist: "The Zulus... would probably work
harder than the English."[Potomac Watch: Pat Buchanan
Puts Conservatism Back in a Pup Tent,
December 13, 1991.]
This comment reveals an
utter innocence about the reality of ethnic and cultural
differences, let alone about little things like tradition and
history—in short, the greater part of the conservative vision.
Even in its own purblind terms, it is totally false. All the
empirical evidence is that immigrants from developed countries
assimilate better than those from underdeveloped countries. It
is developed countries that teach the skills required for
success in the United States. As Borjas puts it
"... the per capita GNP in the
United Kingdom is more than six times greater than [that of] the
Dominican Republic. It is not surprising that immigrant
households originating in the Dominican Republic are about five
times more likely to
be on welfare than those in the United Kingdom."
But it should not be
necessary to explain that the legacy of Shaka and Cetewayo—overthrown
just over a century ago-is not that of Alfred the Great, let
alone Elizabeth II or any civilized society.
Let's spell it out with an
anecdote. Recently, the South African police were perplexed by
an epidemic of murders on the black commuter trains between the
townships and Johannesburg. Naturally, Nelson Mandela's African
National Congress blamed the government. But the victims were
from all factions. Now it has emerged that the black operators
of the
semi-legal private cab services competing with the railroad
had paid gangs of those hard-working Zulus to influence consumer
preferences by going on board and throwing passengers from the
moving trains.
Click
here for Part 2...