Epistemology

The violent take it by force

By ck ⋅ December 27, 2007 ⋅ Post a comment

From the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven has suffered violence, and the violent take it by force.  Matthew 11:12.I asked Andrew Simone to be a guest blogger here, quite aware that he would write in a vastly different style than is usual for this blog.  As much as I enjoy Michel Foucault (in fact, I just bought his Archaeology of Knowledge with my Borders Bucks yesterday), I’m not a continental philosopher.  Okay, I’m not a philosopher, I’m a philosophy student.  But the tradition which I imbide regularly is analytic. I’ve always wondered how far apart the two “traditions” really are.  After Foucault, I am curious about the discourse in which we label philosophies as “continental” or “analytic” and what kinds of assumptions those entail about what knowledge is. So Andrew showed up and wrote a parable.  I think, in my entire time writing here, I’ve written only one piece of fiction or parable on the blog.  The comments there display how well that attempt went!  Andrew’s parable is about violence and about the choices people make throughout their lives.  In his follow-up post, second of a promised trilogy, he makes two major claims.  (Here comes the analytic rebuttal!)1. Choosing a religion commodifies both what you choose and what you reject.

2. Philosophy needs to “situate itself in the difficulties of the pluralisms which these narratives of violence draw strength from.”I’ll start with 1. Part of this claim is the subclaim that “choice may mean violence,” and that’s what I want to tackle.  What do we mean by violence? Careful attention to our language displays metaphors employed that are taken from violence. I want to “tackle” Andrew’s claims, to give a “rebuttal.” Does that imply that rational discourse is inherently about waging war?To make this sort of claim, we’d need to demonstrate something about the way our language uses metaphors.  How much do they influence our behavior, and our inferences?  (I’m hinting here at some of what Stephen Pinker writes about in The Stuff of Thought.) 

Setting that aside for now as an open question, what does it mean to “commodify” a religion? Dictionary definitions won’t solve philosophical problems, but let’s look at the term commodity:

1. Something useful that can be turned to commercial or other advantage

2. An article of trade or commerce, especially an agricultural or mining product that can be processed and resold.

3. Advantage; benefit.

4. Obsolete A quantity of goods.

(Source: thefreedictionary.com)

There are a few tangled up assumptions here–first, that there is potentially something negative, or incorrect, about understanding religion as something that can be turned to advantage. In making a choice, I am making a choice for my own advantage, and perhaps this is not being selfless, or (more metaphysically) not taking an objective stance.  But choice is all about the human perspective, weighing reasons.  So self must be part of any choice, even if we’re trying to take out biases which impact our reasoning.  I am making a religious choice for someone–me.

If the larger point is that “religion” itself becomes commodified, I don’t see where that is uniquely tied to individuals choosing to affiliate with one religion or another.  I will grant the historical viewpoint, that with the growth American capitalism came an increase in religious choice, but we’d need to take on questions of  causation before saying more there.

Finally, if the point is that choosing a religion makes the it not an end in itself, but a means to something else (definition 2), then I think that’s just restating the point of most religions. For Christianity, Christendom is a means to right relation with God. For Buddhists, the eightfold path is a ladder that can be tossed aside when we reach Nirvana. Etc.

As to Andrew’s second point, here I find myself scratching my head, wondering, “Maybe continentals really do speak another language!”  I have reread the phrase several times: ”situate itself in the difficulties of the pluralisms which these narratives of violence draw strength from.”  Narratives of violence seem to equal discourses which interpret reality in a victim/oppressor lens.  Andrew seems to be saying that philosophy needs to see what gives these narratives such power and influence over people, and then…?

That’s where I find myself getting lost. Is the point rhetorical? What does it have to do with metaphysics?

When he comes back from vacation, I’d be very interested to hear his third point, in which he’s promised to ” flesh out the ‘Hericletian inversion,’ its faux-peace, and its relationship to language.” Maybe we’re both asking the same questions with different metaphors. Or perhaps they’re getting in the way.